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Pakistan and Indonesia in terms of religious leader-
ship represent Ð in some respects Ð opposite situa-
tions. In both societies we find a significant Ôlegalis-
ticÕ vs. ÔSufiÕ divide, but the two forms of Islam are ex-
pressed and played out in different ways. Most im-
portantly, they have different relationships with
their governments that have produced drastically
different results.
Inter-communal
Violence in Pakistan
and Indonesia
In January 1998, I attended a gathering of
Fulbrighters in Lahore Ð both Pakistani and
American. Just having returned from In-
donesia, where I had been teaching at a
government-run Islamic institute, I told the
others that I had been struck by how much
the government of Indonesia controlled re-
ligious matters. It set the curriculum for the
institutes, appointed faculty, and hired the
graduates to work in the bureaucracy as ex-
perts on Islamic matters. These graduates,
of course, would be expected to be mem-
bers of the ruling Golkar party. The govern-
ment did not permit people who had gone
through the centuries-old pesantren educa-
tional system to enter the government insti-
tutes unless they had gone to a government
school as well. The traditional pesantren (a
religious boarding school), which is a cross
between a dervish conventicle and an Indi-
an ashram Ð is a completely independent fa-
cility. It is run by a kiyai, a Sufi-like figure
who holds his position through heredity as
well as through the recognition he receives
in society. These kiyais were being heavily
pressured to conform to government poli-
cies and to be part of the Golkar party.
When I finished my presentation, a Pak-
istani man in the room said that he wished
that the Pakistanis had someone trying to
control their religious leaders. He, with oth-
ers chiming in, said that Pakistan had just
the opposite problem: that the government
had no control over the maulavis and that
they were making a mess of the country.
They wished that the government could
rein them in, as they seem to have done in
Indonesia.
Not long after that meeting, violence
erupted in Indonesia. In Pakistan, inter-com-
munal violence continued to escalate. The
press regularly reported attacks by Sunnis
and ShiÕa on one anotherÕs mosques in the
Punjab. Indeed, I visited some of the
mosques that had been attacked. In the of-
fice of one, the filing cabinet was stocked
with guns and rifles, which were brought
out to protect the congregates gathered for
prayers. The Christian community of Pak-
istan also feels besieged as a result of death
sentences imposed on Christians accused of
blasphemy. While tensions between Mus-
lims and Christians have existed for deca-
des, these accusations and the violence as-
sociated with them are a phenomenon of
the late 1980s and 1990s.
Why the violence?
While religious tensions are hardly the
only factor influencing riots and fighting in
Indonesia, religion certainly is of impor-
tance when assessing violence on the is-
lands of Java, Ambon, and Sumatra. In Java
and Ambon, clashes between Muslims and
Christians have taken many lives.
In Sumatra, the weakening of the regime
has unleashed decades-old resentments
over the issue of who defines and controls
Islam.
In Karachi a Roman Catholic priest of Goan
descent told me, Ô[The province of] Sindh is
saturated with the culture of Sufism. Go be-
yond Karachi and you will find a lot of pirs.
Sufis and pirs have the highest regard for
the human being. They do not speak of the
supremacy of any religion, but they speak of
the unity of mankind.Õ In his eyes and in the
eyes of so many other Pakistanis, including
the people listening to my presentation on
Indonesia in Lahore, it is not the pirs or the
traditional religious leaders that are the
problem in society. Rather, it is the maulavis
who are causing the dissension, the clerics
who deliver Friday sermons and speak for
the narrowest of interpretations of Islam. Es-
sentially, the maulavis are fighting a proxy
war between Saudi Arabia and Iran Ð a war
that the Pakistani government does not dis-
courage.
The situation in Pakistan
At an imambarghah in Lahore Ð a place
devoted to the remembrance of the Imam
Hussein Ð a man who had apprenticed him-
self to a dervish as a young boy, sat in the
midst of some of his devotees. Others
among his followers took me aside and told
me how the recently rebuilt imambarghah
had been destroyed by Sunnis a few years
ago. ÔIt is the maulavis,Õ they said. They ex-
plained that they were not singling out only
Sunni maulavis. They did not like any reli-
gious leaders who divided people and insti-
gated hatred.
In the city of Gujrat, the leader of the ShiÕa
is not a man who studied at a madrasa.
Rather, his father had been the ShiÕite head-
man of the area, and now the mantle of
leadership had fallen on his shoulders. He
too had little taste for maulavis and prided
himself on the peaceful relations that he
had helped to promote between Sunnis and
ShiÕas of this town Ð though the two com-
munities lived in separate quarters.
In Pakistan, religious leaders of all vari-
eties function independently of the govern-
ment, though certainly the government is
very keen on having the support of Islamic
groups. Zia al-Haq, the military leader who
took over Pakistan in a coup in the 1980s,
tried to placate and thus control the leading
Islamic groups (principally the Jamaat-i Isla-
mi) by inaugurating laws that could be por-
trayed as being in keeping with the Shariah;
the hudood (criminal) laws and the blasphe-
my laws being the most controversial. But
neither Zia nor the succeeding govern-
ments have been successful in completely
winning over the Islamic groups. While
Nawaz Sharif has made many overtures, the
Jamaat regularly protest his policies. Obvi-
ously, the government does not have a
great deal of say in the activities of the Is-
lamist groups, yet it will step on the rights of
minorities in order to try to placate even the
most radical organizations.
The situation in Indonesia
Indonesia presents a very different pic-
ture. I visited some of the pesantrens, as I
was interested in observing the lives of the
students in these boarding schools. There
was enormous variety among the pe-
santrens. Some did follow a government
curriculum with a full spectrum of courses,
while others maintained their traditional
role Ð a place where one memorizes the
Koran and the hadith and lives a life of
prayer. These are the places where the In-
donesian Sufi tradition is preserved. The in-
dependence of some of these boarding
schools from government control became
most obvious to me when I was visiting the
northern part of the island of Madura off the
coast of Java. On the birthday of the
Prophet, thousands of people Ð men in their
traditional sarongs and pecces (the so-called
ÔSukarno hatÕ) and women covered in their
jilbabs Ð were making their way to the beach
where a huge sound system had been as-
sembled for speeches. In the villages nearby
were pesantrens where serious young men
wandered about clutching hand-written
texts to their breasts. It was in places such as
these that resistance to Dutch colonial rule
had been organized and where further re-
sistance to tyranny could also be fostered.
Certainly I saw the potential for anti-govern-
ment activity much like that found in the
madrasas in Qom a generation ago. Of
course, the pesantrens can also be leaders in
sectarian violence as their resentment to-
wards the government can be aimed at any-
one who seems favourable to it. Since it is
part of government policy to recognize and
protect the rights of five religious communi-
ties, the minorities tended to be subdued in
their criticism of the government.
On the other hand, those who were con-
sidered Ôthe ulamaÕ of Indonesia, the ones
who had completed their studies in reli-
gious law, etc., have posed no threat to the
government. In fact, in the face of the most
obvious corruption, these men have tended
to remain silent rather than be a voice of
protest. I spoke to a member of the Council
of Ulama, which is essentially a committee
that issues fatwas. It was the councilÕs job,
he said, to convey to the people the wishes
of the government rather than to advise the
government about the Islamic position on
an issue. One example is that of population
control. After initial resistance, the ulama
came around to the governmentÕs thinking
and actively promoted birth control as a
sound Islamic idea. At this time of crisis,
most of these men may lack the prestige
necessary for constructive leadership. While
they might have received points for being
somewhat open-minded and tolerant of
peoples of other religions Ð at least those
that are legally recognized Ð they also have
not spoken out against the abuses of the
Suharto regime.
The two extremes
When the governments of Pakistan and
Indonesia have actively intervened in reli-
gious matters, they helped (whether inad-
vertently or not) to produce radicalism in
different sectors of their religious communi-
ties. While the Sufis of Pakistan continue to
have a more or less stabilizing effect on so-
ciety, the situation for their Indonesian
counterparts is more volatile. In both coun-
tries attempts have been made to co-opt
Islam for political purposes. While the In-
donesian government has successfully con-
trolled religious leadership, the government
of Pakistan, in failing to do so, has encour-
aged sectarianism. '
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